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Human trafficking and legal culture 
 
David Nelken 
 
Can we do justice in an unjust world? The obvious reply is that it is only because of 
injustice that we need to seek justice. But what about the way patterns of injustice can 
also condition the results of our interventions? My attempt here to say something 
useful about this difficult question will focus on the progress achieved so far by the 
Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. Is the use 
of such Human Rights instruments in the fight against human trafficking a way of 
moving towards more global justice? Or is this another example of how many 
struggles against injustice are undone by continuing social, economic and political 
inequalities which, at best, this sort of approach is unable to tackle, and, at worst, 
actually help to reinforce?  
 
The Palermo protocol was agreed to in 2000 as an amendment to the convention 
against transnational organised crime. Its aim was to safeguard the rights of victims 
of trafficking and see them as just as much victims of this criminal behaviour as are 
the citizens of countries or places to which they were trafficked.
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In 2009 The Rome 
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 The drafting of this Protocol was completed in Palermo December 2000. and has 
been signed so far by 117 countries. It commits ratifying states to prevent and combat 
trafficking in persons, protect and assist victims of trafficking and promote 
cooperation among states in order to meet those objectives. Articles 6-8 of the UN 
Protocol on Trafficking outline a comprehensive framework for the protection of 
victims of trafficking, which guides State Parties to provide for victims’ physical, 
psychological and social recovery with appropriate housing, counselling and 
information regarding their legal rights, medical and material assistance, employment 
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office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) convened a meeting to 
discuss what had been achieved by the protocol arguing that there was still a long 
way to go in terms of making its provisions effective. It was particularly concerned 
about what happens to a 'one -size-fits- all' type of international standard in different 
places. In the 'concept note', that was sent in advance to participants, the aim was said 
to be to 'elaborate recommendations on the applicability of the Palermo Protocol and 
other provisions directly related to trafficking in persons, to the diversity of national 
legal contexts and cultures' (Albano, 2009). It suggested that, in particular, 
differences in legal culture could provide some clues about how to overcome 
shortfalls in implementation and  bring about more convergence and collaboration 
amongst the different countries and agencies involved in tackling the problem (or 
problems) of trafficking. 
 
In this paper I argue that it is certainly helpful to learn more about legal culture as it 
applies to trafficking and anti- trafficking. But it is also essential to see how the 
issues involved go well beyond the illuminating power of any one concept. The first 
part of this paper offers a critical discussion of what is entailed by speaking of this 
problem as one of a shortfall of enforcement. The paper then go on to show that there 
are two competing narratives about this social problem and the way it is being 
responded to and explains why we need to learn more about the  interests and values 
that condition the 'law in action'. In the last section I examine the potential relevance 
of the idea of the ' legal culture' for explaining the patterns of 'law in action' in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and educational assistance and training, to ensure for the physical safety as well as 
privacy and confidentiality of victims, and to facilitate the possibility of obtaining 
compensation for damage suffered. In addition, the UN Protocol on Trafficking 
encourages States to consider adopting appropriate measures allowing victims of 
trafficking in persons to remain in their territory, either temporarily or permanently or 
to facilitate the safe and dignified repatriation of victims of trafficking should they 
desire to return to their place of origin.  
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different countries and different agencies. I conclude by showing how issues about 
legal culture must be contextualised in relation to the wider question of how far using 
human rights can produce global standards of justice.  
 
 
1   Evaluating outcomes 
 
The Palermo protocol is an example of an international agreement, reached after 
painstaking attempts to reach consensus that has been ratified by a very large number 
of countries. The protocol, as the whole convention against transnational crime of 
which it forms part, has been undeniably successful in gaining agreement on paper 
from countries in the North and South, from the First to the Third world, from 
demand, supply and transit countries. Many countries have passed their own 
domestic legislation related to human trafficking, even if not always exactly in the 
same terms. Places as different as Italy, Serbia or Norway have introduced 'reflection 
periods' for the trafficked person to consider his or her choices, and no longer linking 
the rights of trafficked victims solely to their willingness to give evidence against 
their captors. In the European human rights community efforts are being made to 
build on the protocol to reach even higher standards.  
 
Nonetheless, many of those most closely involved with its implementation argue that 
it has not (yet) brought the results hoped for. It has, so far, only lead to relatively few 
cases being prosecuted- - and has not had a measurable effect on reducing the 
phenomenon it is supposed to deal with. Basically, there is a large shortfall in 
implementation and enforcement. According to the concept note, 'of the estimated 
600,000 to 4 million trafficked persons, identified, assisted and protected
1
, on average 
only 6,000 perpetrators are successfully prosecuted every year ' (Albano, 2009). And 
many authors continue to put the numbers of trafficking victims even higher (see the 
introduction to Winterdyk and Reichel, 2010). What can explain these poor results? 
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There are a number of reasons why this question is harder to answer than might seem 
at first. As with all crimes, the numbers apprehended will be a function of the amount 
of enforcement effort put in - the number of those prosecuted never matches the 
actual number of victims. To explain how this happens in different places involves 
making sense of cross- cultural differences in criminal justice which can be very 
difficult (Nelken, 2000, 2010). Even when it comes to much more straightforward 
ordinary domestic street crimes such as burglary there is an enormous gulf between 
the estimated number of offences committed  (as calculated for example on the basis 
of responses to a victimisation survey), and the actual numbers of offenders 
apprehended, prosecuted and sanctioned. In burglary the same offender may be 
responsible for many offences. But if the stereotype of transnational organised 
criminal groups controlling large flows of people is taken at face value, then we 
would also expect to find that there would be an especially high ratio of victims to 
criminals in these kinds of cases.  
 
It is true of course that unlike  a crime such as burglary, the victims of human 
trafficking usually do know who is exploiting them (or at least the middlemen or 
women whom they are in contact with). But, on the other hand, there are a number of 
special features of this crime to bear in mind. Victims may be physically or 
psychologically prevented from coming forward- this is indeed part of what is 
involved in this crime.They may be terrified, not only about what could happen to 
them, but also what could be done to their families back home. They often do not 
speak the language or know the local laws - or - on occasion even exactly where they 
are. Sometime they may suffer from the so -called ' 'Stockholm syndrome' in which 
captives identify with their captors. Given that they are illegal immigrants, victims 
will often be frightened of the police, and it is often rational for them to think that the 
police will not always have their interests at heart. They may have mixed feelings 
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about their situation or its possible improvement- and may consider it preferable to 
being sent home.
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Despite the existence of a large literature on trafficking we still lack basic knowledge 
of the gender, age, or backgrounds of potential and actual victims. Some agencies 
claim that it is not only poverty that places people at risk of being trafficked. It is 
certainly true that economic migrants are not necessarily those with least resources. 
But it seems reasonable to assume that trafficking victims are usually going to be 
those who are most vulnerable- especially as official attention is overwhelmingly 
given to those subject to sexual trafficking as compared to other kinds of exploitation.  
We also need to learn more about when numbers trafficked go up or down -and how 
and when trafficking routes shift -and how far this may be a result of economic and 
political changes or a response to counter-trafficking efforts. 
 
Likewise, we have only a rough idea about the numbers in any one country compared 
to others, know less than we should about how cases are dealt with in different places 
and have few systematic studies of the results of such efforts. What determines 
changes in patterns of legal violation is probably more tied to changes in conditions 
of demand and supply than to the actions of law enforcement. Even in dealing with 
illegal drugs, where there is a much longer history of law enforcement, best estimates 
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 My wife used to be a penal judge in Italy. She is normally very discrete in speaking 
about her court work. But one day she came home with quite a shocked look after 
dealing with a case of trafficking. It involved a Chinese worker, kept in a basement 
with no air, out of sight, and working an extravagant number of hours. Interrogating 
the victim to gain evidence against his employers she asked him questions such as 
what it was like, day by day, to live in those conditions, and he described what  
seemed like an impossible way of life. After hearing these horrors, she asked him: 
"How do you put up with it? How could you survive in those conditions?" But he 
replied: "It is still better than living in China". 
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are that no more than 10% of the supply is interrupted by the police and customs. So, 
in addition to criminal law, other levers of social and economic policy must also play 
a role in responding to trafficking so as to find ways to bring into alignment the 
different interests of supply, demand and transit countries. 
 
What this means is that, despite the efforts to produce better ' indexes' of trafficking ( 
Kangaspunta, 2010), no one really has a clear idea of how many potential cases there 
could be (and there can be ambiguity in the way the question of 'shortfall' is posed- as 
when the IOM speaks of those ' identified' 'assisted' and 'protected' as if these were 
necessarily the same). The main inter-governmental agencies that deal with this 
problem now generally try to avoid offering firm figures - though this does not stop 
others from doing so
3
. It is not just the considerable uncertainty in the estimate in the 
number of cases trafficked- even the lowest of the estimates would represent a 
massive quota of human misery. The problem rather is that there is no more definite 
evidence of the lower figure of 600,000 than of the larger figure of 4,000,000. In 
2006, we are told by the United Nations, (only) 21, 400 victims were actually 
identified among the 111 countries who made reports, though 73 countries saw at 
least one conviction. A core of 47 countries reported making at least 10 convictions 
per year, with 15 making at least five times this number (UN, 2009). In these terms, 
6000 actually sounds like a good number of prosecutions in relation to the number of 
victims identified. But then the new question becomes why are so few victims ever 
identified?  
 
The fundamental problem here is how to identify what is meant by a trafficked 
person in the absence of official certification of this fact. Whose definitions count- 
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 As seen for example in the following statement ' There are no official figures but the 
International Office for Migration (IOM) estimates there are 70,000 women living in 
Italy after being trafficked for sexual exploitation. And some local rights groups 
believe as many as half of them are Nigerian.' (JENDA, 2006) 
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and whose should count? Certainly, the low numbers of such cases could just reflect 
the difficulty in getting this crime into the open and the fact that most countries have 
not yet geared up to applying this protocol. And this is not the only type of crime 
where the low number of people apprehended may tell us little about the size of the 
problem. Consider violence against women- a crime that in fact overlaps with human 
trafficking, or the slowly emerging contours of so- called hate crime. The same is true 
for the relatively few people succesfully prosecuted for crimes against humanity or 
genocide. Some leading criminologists argue that in these cases health and human 
rights organizations seriously underestimate the number of victims (Hagan and 
Wyland - Richmond, 2008). 
 
One response to this difficulty is to seek to sensitise police and other enforcement 
agencies to the possibility that they are failing to notice victims of trafficking. In the 
USA those police forces that actually look for these sort of cases - and know what to 
look for- are much more likely to find them (Farell, McDevitt, and Fahy, 2010). 
Nonetheless, the record also shows that even where enforcement efforts have 
deliberately been stepped up the results are curiously disappointing. Again and again 
efforts to find trafficking victims in demand countries such as the USA, UK, Canada, 
the Netherlands or Ireland, have produced much lower numbers than expected (not to 
mention the way media claims that the 2006 world cup in Germany would attract 
forty thousand sex slaves to service the spectators, turned out to have no foundation). 
In the USA there were only 1362 official cases in the period from 2000-2007.  
Researchers trying to gather a useful sample of cases, frustrated by the lack of official 
cases, soemtimes fall back on counting cases of prostitutes treated very badly 
(Winterdyck and Reichel, 2010). Or they may claim that the low number of victims 
can be explained as police and even judges persisting on treating cases that could fit 
the definition of trafficking as cases of smuggling or prostitution tout court 
(Winterdyck and Reichel, 2010). On the other hand, what are called trafficking cases 
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can, in practice, often overlap with prosecutions of sex workers, pimps, brothel 
keepers, landlords- or even clients. 
 
Some journalists who write about supply countries provide qualitative evidence that 
suggests that a large number of women are at risk of trafficking. But, according to 
these same authors, in these places even a high number of cases  processed by police 
and courts can offer an unreliable measure of legally defined trafficking cases. In 
Moldova, for example, rather than tackle high- level collusion between officials and 
traffickers, police prefer to rack up large numbers of questionable cases in a 
bureaucratic way
4
 so as to make up the statistics needed to justify the large 
disbursements for anti -trafficking received from the USA (Finnegan, 2008). Reports 
of the actual numbers of trafficking cases discovered by given countries are easy to 
'manage' and massage politically in one direction or the other- whether the aim is to 
gain credit for combating the traffic or to avoid stigma by denying that the problem 
exists.  
 
Is it safe to assume that trafficking is always run by organised criminals? We are 
repeatedly told in the literature that the gains from this commerce in human beings 
are third only to that from the arms and drugs trades. But we are as short of 
systematic information about types of offenders as about victims. Most of the 
discussion of human trafficking available is about trafficking for sexual purposes. But 
there are likely to be important differences between trafficking for sex, for work or 
for other purposes. The organisation of trafficking can also vary from place to place. 
Louise Shelly, for example, suggests that there are at least three models of 
trafficking, ranging from what she calls-'the  primitive collection of raw materials 
locally', the 'natural resource model ' that produces short term profits through sending 
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Finnengan suggests that this reveals the 'formalistic' type of compliance that 
organisations learned in Communist times (which is another example of the relevance 
of legal culture). 
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on victims to intermediaries, to the ' trade and development model', based on 
continuing relationships with villagers who share in the profits (Shelly, 2008). Such 
differences, insofar as they are stable, could offer important clues for counter -
trafficking by throwing light on the different ways that victims get trapped and are 
unable to break away.  
 
The official characterisation of organised crime groups often tells us more about 
political and law- enforcement stereotypes than it does about the fluid and changing 
nature of the groups and networks involved. It is especially relevant that the 
smuggling of human beings -the much larger activity of which human trafficking 
forms a segment- usually involves specialised intermediaries rather than organised 
crime syndicates (Pastore, Monzini, and Sciortino, 2006). Even older- type slavery 
relied heavily on local middle men, small family firms and migrant runners. In the 
past some of the effort to defeat slavery was misdirected because this point was 
missed. There is even some danger that massive enforcement effort against 
trafficking could have the unintended result of increasing the size and sophistication 
of the professional groups involved so as to allow them to match or corrupt the forces 
aiming to control them. On the other hand, those powerful organisations who are 
involved, are able to change their modus operandi in a way that makes it very hard to 
prosecute according to the definition of trafficking- as in the recent use of so called - 
'happy trafficking' where they send previously trafficked persons back home to 
recruit new ones.  
 
We also need to ask why and how prosecution numbers matter. Are they to be seen as 
a sign of taking victim protection seriously or can they also be an alternative to doing 
that. The expressed goals of the protocol are to protect and prevent, not only to 
prosecute. Prevention can and does require different activities to that of prosecution 
(including education, information campaigns, building institutional capacity, and 
raising public awareness). Rescue missions set out to save people from captivity. 
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Agencies produce booklets with pictures of 'at risk' young women in Nigeria being 
taught sewing in schools supported under anti- trafficking initiatives. These need to 
be evaluated in other ways than by looking at the numbers of offenders prosecuted
5
. 
In the American legal journals there is also much discussion of how to give victims 
of trafficking rights to compensation. These responses can sometimes mean investing 
less in prosecution. Other ways of dealing with the problem are still more 
controversial. Is the number of immigrants  repatriated a fair criterion to be used to 
measure the effectiveness of the protocol?  
 
Over and above the prosecution of those criminals involved in trafficking we also 
need to take into account the role of meta- sanctions- or sanctions about sanctions- 
used against States themselves. Measuring compliance or lack of compliance with 
such agreed standards is increasingly important as part of the processes of what has 
been called 'signalling conformity' (Nelken, 2006b); the stakes being continuing 
participation in trade and political networks. At the extreme, States may actually be 
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 The concept note ' (Albano, 2009) rightly speaks of a variety of factors that help to 
explain the 'low levels of protection and prosecution'. 'These reasons' it says ' include, 
primarily, the lack of conceptual clarity, the relative “newness” of the Protocol, the 
disproportionate focus on combating irregular migration and on the irregular status of 
the victims rather than on the violation of their human rights; as well as the 
disproportionate focus on source countries and supply of potential migrants rather 
than on destination countries and the demand of low skilled migrant manpower.' It 
points out that ' while Prosecution refers openly to criminal law tools, Protection and 
Prevention explicitly employ the language of human rights, recalling some core 
challenges related to international migration management, human and social 
development, migrant workers’ mobility and the protection of their rights. The 
overlooking of the human rights dimension in trafficking seems to have resulted in a 
distorted perception of the phenomenon and, consequently, an often limited process 
of implementation and application of the Protocol’s provisions. ' 
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in collusion with the criminals (Cirineo and Studnicka, 2010). But the usual aim of 
international agreements (as with other examples of 'global prescriptions ') is to put 
pressure on States to do more about prosecution and to bring regulatory bodies into 
existence or improve the functioning of those that exist.  Sometimes one or more self- 
selected countries will take the lead in promoting compliance (subject to its own 
political agendas). The most obvious example here being the USA. Although itself 
hesitant about joining many international agreements on penal law, it is at the 
forefront of dealing with human trafficking
 
 and monitors compliance by other States 
by placing them in a three (or four) tier classification that has consequences for its 
foreign aid budgets and the tax levels it applies to foreign imports or investments. 
6
 
Once again we face the vexed question of 'who guards the guardians'? 
 
In sum, measuring the effects of human rights initiatives is a complex matter about 
which we still have too little experience. What are compliance indicators (good) for? 
Which outcomes matter? How do they matter? To whom do and should they matter? 
Measuring outcomes cannot just be reduced to number of prosecutions- it concerns  
much larger issues of 'good governance'
7
. It is difficult to evaluate prosecution 
numbers without also considering these alternative interventions. Low numbers 
prosecuted can mean failure to take action, or  that the jurisdiction in question is 
taking a different approach to the problem. Thus they can be a sign of weak or of 
relatively successful efforts at prevention. And the meaning of these numbers 
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 Israel is an example of a country that felt obliged to improve its performance after 
being classified as unsatisfactory in this way. 
7
Rosga and Satterthwaite (2008) argue that 'Rather than trusting in numbers'.  
alone, those using human rights compliance indicators should embrace the 
opportunities presented by this new project, finding ways to utilize human rights 
indicators as a tool of global governance that allow the governed to form strategic 
political alliances with global bodies in the task of holding their governors to 
account.' 
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changes depending on the wider frame we are using. For example, those making the 
most use of the Palermo protocol are not necessarily those most successful at dealing 
with challenges of immigration. Arguably, those investing more in well organised 
inclusionary policies for immigrants will have less need and less inclination to 
provide what may seem to them a haphazard way of integrating immigrants 
(Solivetti, 2010).  
 
2. De-constructing the problem of trafficking 
 
All this suggests - or should suggest - that there are limits to the value of answers that 
can be provided by so called 'administrative criminology', the sort that takes a given 
definition of crime for granted and restricts itself to considering the operational 
difficulties of bringing it to book. In fact, many of those who are trying to deal with 
this multi- faceted phenomenon are the first to recognize that the 'problem' cannot be 
'solved' when posed in these terms. We need rather to consider trafficking as an 
example of the making of a 'social problem' (Rubington and Weinberg, 1981; Spector 
and Kitsuse, 2001; Nelken, 2007b). The posited relationship between trafficking and 
transnational crime has as much if not more to do with national and international 
responses to the challenges of globalisation as it has to do with concerns for the 
human victims of this trade. The campaign against trafficking stands at the 
intersection of a number of controversial issues: the loss of sovereignty of the 
national State and the shift of power to higher and lower levels; the rise of the threat 
of transnational organized crime, the regulation of immigration and informal labour, 
the fight against violence and discrimination against women, the control of 
prostitution and sex- work., the patrolling of State boundaries and sharpening of the 
line between citizens and mere 'denizens' (Westmorland, 2010). In the broadest view 
the proscription of human trafficking can be seen as an aspect of changing boundaries 
(whether political, geographical or moral) and the struggle over such boundaries .  
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Without denying that a variety of extremely serious harms are committed by 
organised and other crime groups it is important to note that the opportunities that 
they exploit are often created or exacerbated by prohibition itself. In our case this is 
seen in the way globalisation promotes the free circulation of goods but not people. 
As long as this continues, criminals will continue to package people as goods. The 
desire to immigrate -even illegally- is stimulated by a situation of global ' anomie' in 
which increasing numbers of people are included culturally in messages of the good 
life but excluded socially from the possibility of fully enjoying it. The fight against 
transnational criminals is also not as straightforward as it is made to seem. After the 
fall of the iron curtain, such criminals took over the place previously occupied by 
communism as the pre-eminent global threat
8
. They offered a 'suitable enemy' for the 
reinforcement of State power -the construction of political alliances and larger units 
such as the European Union, as well as USA -led initiatives. Trafficking may be seen 
as just one illustration of the 'moral panic' (Cohen, 2004) connected to their activities 
- and it is interesting that the collapse of communism quickly led to concern about the 
arrival of prostitutes from former eastern bloc countries. The panic here also draws 
on a more long standing worries about the ' white slave trade'.  
 
Too often scholars or activists concentrate on their 'own' crime issue to the exclusion 
of others. The fight against trafficking can also be usefully compared to that being 
waged against other forms of transnational organised crime, especially as it may be 
the same organised crime groups engaging in more than one of these activities.There 
are, in fact, surprisingly similar debates about the extent or characteristics of a variety 
of other transnational crimes (including those that overlap with trafficking). In the 
case of the supply and use of drugs, there are issues over how much the problem 
could be reduced by legalisation. Likewise, as regards to prostitution, there is a 
sophisticated body of literature about policy choices between prohibition, legalisation 
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 Their place as the major threat is now shared with fundamentalist Islamic terrorism 
and the more diffuse dangers to the environment. 
 14 
or regulation. When it comes to the trade in human body parts there is extensive 
debate about whether the crime in question really exists - or at least whether its 
prevalence is anything like what is claimed. Beneath the rhetoric of the war against 
crime there is often some level of collusion. Governments fight arms trafficking -
except of course where they are themselves involved, directly or indirectly. The same 
applies to irregular immigration. Apart from the difficulties and costs of actually 
paying the real costs of expulsion, in many countries there is, at some level, an 
acceptance of the inevitability and even the utility of illegal immigration. Not only do 
such immigrants take on jobs which the locals no longer wish to do - the low wages 
they are paid has the function of depressing the pay of other workers- including 
regular immigrants (Calavita, 2005).  
 
When it comes to explaining the struggle against transnational crime it often seems 
that we have to choose between two opposing narratives. One stresses the noble fight 
of the State, intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies and others to defeat 
dangerous criminals and extend the scope and reach of human rights (Naim, 2005). 
The other points to the way those seeking to block illegal flows in fact often exploit 
the problems of given victims for their own interests (Nordstrom, 2007; Van Schindel 
and Abraham, 2005). The first repeats obsessively that criminal justice is territorial 
whereas organized crime is not confined by national boundaries and that therefore 
international 'collaboration' is the only solution. The alternative view insists that this 
claim often exaggerates the degree of coordination between organized crime groups 
and, conversely underplays the way 'governing through international crime' in fact 
serves as a way of maintaining order at national and local levels (Nelken, 1997b). For 
this approach, efforts to overcome organised crime can have effects on human rights 
that are in some ways as serious as those threatened by the criminals themselves. 
 
The literature dealing specifically with human trafficking reproduces such contrasting 
narratives. The first story, told by those who created the Palermo protocol and who 
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belong to organisations that seek to have it implemented, describes how vulnerable 
people are forced or deceived (for example by being made to incur debts) into 
situations where they can be exploited. For them - and for most mainstream 
commentators - human trafficking is a terrible evil, a new form of slavery, part of the 
dark side of globalization. In fighting against it, we are contributing to a new 
emergent form of global solidarity. As the Durkheimian school of sociology would 
put it, economic interests alone cannot guarantee continuing social relations in 
conditions of uncertainty. If economic links and exchanges are now global, there 
must be a 'moral' basis that makes this worldwide interdependence possible and 
which it furthers (Durkheim, 1893/2008). Nation-states are not only responding to the 
challenge to the authority posed by transnational criminal enterprises. By helping 
victims of human trafficking -and also the victims of sex tourism abroad-  they are 
increasingly extending protections to non- nationals. The fight for the human rights 
of trafficking victims is thus one part of a larger battle for human rights in general 
(Findlay, 2008). 
 
But it is also possible to tell another story. Going back again to Durkheim, we can 
equally use his study of modern solidarity to argue that global 'coerced' division of 
labour' can never produce solidarity- and that the fight against human trafficking does 
little to produce a fairer global distribution of life chances. The fight against 
trafficking can be seen as a form of legitimation (the exception proving the rule) 
within the general tightening up border controls by developed countries - both in  
"fortress Europe" and elsewhere. The goal of law enforcement, especially in 
economically advanced countries, is overwhelmingly focused on ending illegal 
migration. Or else the issue is one of controlling sex workers so as to reduce 
prostitution (Augustin, 2007). In general, governments rarely send the police out 
looking for human rights' violations. Even though the crossing of national borders is 
not an essential part of the definition of exploitation little is done to tackle internal 
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trafficking inside poorer countries, especially if prostitutes are working from 
apartments and not on the streets.  
 
Some authors even go as far as saying that politicians themselves should be seen as 
trafficking the women involved-or at least competing with criminals to make 
something of them for their own reasons. It is they after all - and not the organised 
criminals -who instruct the police to take them back to the places to which they 
usually do not wish to return, and from which they have often tried to get away 
(Davies and Davies, 2008).
9
Against the background of a politics shaped by 'border 
panic' and xeno- racism, trying to save some people who are particularly badly 
treated does nothing to stop the mass of irregular illegal immigrants from continuing 
to be treated as a threat- even if de facto both prostitutes and irregular immigrants 
continue to supply essential services.  
 
Such overdrawn contrasts have practical implications for the law in action. The legal 
definitions of the protocol are framed in ways that do not easily fit the fuzzy situation 
on the ground, as in the artificial line drawn between those who choose to be 
smuggled and those who are trafficked against their will. Even those being smuggled 
can in fact also be exploited- women in particular stand a high risk of being raped at 
some point on their journey. Amongst those who are trafficked, on the other hand,  it 
may be the women themselves, rather than their captors, who patrol compliance. The 
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 'In summary, trafficked women in the EEA have proved a useful boon to various 
political actors. The heady mix of sexual violence, erotic foreigners, and organised 
crime have offered the ready means by which to introduce legislation and 
programmes throughout Europe that conveniently serve various political agendas 
regarding irregular migration and paid sex. It is time that such uses of trafficked 
women are more openly acknowledged and appreciated by such political actors and 
that the role of political traffickers in sustaining trafficking is better researched' 
(Davies and Davies, 2008).  
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reluctance of such women to be 'saved' may be explained not only by their fears for 
themselves or their families back home, but also because returning to their countries 
of origin is seen by them and others as failure. In some circumstances they may even 
be able to make something useful out of the most difficult of situations, as where they 
are able to find clients to marry them (Davies 2009a, 2009b). 
  
Because reliable information is lacking each of the competing narratives is able to 
produce or highlight different facts about trafficking - or at least offer different  
interpretation of the same facts. It could almost be said that the narratives produce the 
facts rather than vice versa. For those who are convinced that there is an enormous 
'dark figure' of undetected human trafficking cases, the lack of evidence for this only 
shows that there has been insufficient effort at enforcement. Thus the finding that in 
Italy 'only 999 of these permits were granted to Nigerian women between 1998 and 
2004' ( JENDA, 2006) becomes proof of the need to do more and better rather than 
indication of the true scale of the problem. By contrast, for those who are sceptical 
about the size of the problem, the discrepancy between alleged cases and actual cases 
discovered by the police is taken as clear proof that the problem has been blown up 
out of proportion by those with given political and moral agendas and interests (see 
e.g. Guardian /Nick Davies, 2009). 
10
  
 
On internet sites, campaigning groups try to disabuse people of 'myths' about 
trafficking. They spell out reasons why victims of trafficking are so often 'invisible', 
and why they are unable to escape from their captors. For their opponents the myths 
that need to be exposed are the claims that it is easy to hold on to 'sex slaves' against 
                                                 
10
 In the UK a major debate followed the very few cases of sex trafficking uncovered 
in the politically driven police Operation Pentameter, which involved hundreds of 
raids on sex workers over a six month period. Those involved in the discussion did 
not take into account Munro's findings that the police tend to use a strict definition of 
trafficking which insists on proof of lack of consent (Munro, 2005, 2006). 
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their will without being discovered, or that those who are trafficked have no idea of 
what they will be asked to do. The scholars who are convinced that the problem is a 
serious and extensive one refer extensively to reports compiled by those seeking to 
defeat trafficking or to help victims. But, because victims themselves tend to be 
elusive, their interviews are mainly with officials, and those victims they do manage 
to talk to are usually people whose current protection depends on them confirming 
the official story of how trafficking takes place. Writers who question the official 
story, on the other hand, usually rely for their competing evidence on ethnographic 
investigations with small groups of prostitutes or workers who may or may not be 
representative of the many different kinds of situations and contexts covered by the 
phenomenon.  
 
Different ways of responding to trafficking thus help constitute 'the problem'. While 
we may be looking for facts to help us explain the causes of alleged under- 
enforcement it is the politics of enforcement that shapes the 'facts' available to us. 
Intergovernmental agencies such as the International Labour Organisation propose 
their own criteria for deciding whether or not a case counts as one of trafficking 
(ILO, 2009). But other agencies implement the convention according to their own 
ideas of how trafficking takes place. For example, some police in the UK are 
sceptical about many traffickers' stories because they belief that it is the passeurs 
themselves who tell those that they smuggle in illegally to say if they are caught that 
they have been trafficked against their will. Whether or not there is substance to it, 
this belief itself then affects how many cases they treat as 'real' trafficking. On the 
other hand, the difficulty of credibly counting cases of trafficking does not stop the 
USA from evaluating countries in terms of their commitment to this struggle. But 
even where the facts are agreed, there is still room for debate on the merits. Imagine 
that a country uncovers 52 trafficking cases a year. Is this a large enough number to 
justify the investment that such a law enforcement effort requires at the expense of 
other priorities?  
 19 
 
Understanding the contexts in which stories are produced and the purposes and 
publics for which they are tailored can tell us a great deal about which matters are 
emphasised and why (Nelken, 2003) Those charged with enforcing the law or 
implementing the protocol are obliged to assume that there is a problem and explain 
under -enforcement in terms of practical difficulties such as the limits of the legal and 
other instruments available or the shortage of resources, especially, but not only, in 
poorer countries. It will not 'pay' such agencies to admit to certain types of 
complications; those who have to live with given political constraints know better 
than to protest too loudly about them. On the other hand, in other contexts, as long as 
this does not threaten their specialised remit, the same social actors can be very 
radical in emphasising the part played by political and economic interests in shaping 
the problem. The International Labour Organisation, for example, forthrightly indicts 
the way globalisation has brought trade barriers down but made migration more 
difficult. As long as demand rests high for unreasonably cheap products, labour costs 
and services, it argues, there will be exploitation of unprotected, informal and often 
illegal labour and violations of the rights of migrant workers (ILO, 2009).  
 
Many of those actually involved in fighting the problem of trafficking agree in 
principle with much of the second narrative about the relevance of the larger 
background of social, economic and political inequality. Some organisations involved 
in responding to trafficking are so little convinced by the 'official ' assumption of a 
sharp contrast between legal and illegal immigration that they put the term ' criminal' 
in brackets when speaking of illegal migration (Albano, 2009)
 11
- though, 
                                                 
11
 ' (T)he Palermo Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols are framed by the central 
dichotomy of coerced and consensual irregular migration. People who are trafficked 
are assumed not to have given their consent and are considered to be "victims or 
"survivors," whereas people who are smuggled are considered to have willingly 
engaged in a “criminal” enterprise; although both Protocols stipulate that the 
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interestingly, this is not done for the term ' trafficking' itself. In the same way, Italian 
judges specialised in drafting anti- trafficking law treat the problem very seriously. 
But they warn against the tendency to assume that it is always possible to protect 
'perfect victims ' (Giammarinaro, 2007)
1
and emphasise that applying this or any law 
is not enough by itself. For them a 'cultural revolution' is needed by which migrants 
are to be seen as human beings in need - not as offenders to be pursued as criminals. 
But these agencies argue that all change has to start somewhere and see their efforts 
to stop trafficking as a contribution to the larger effort to create a just world. Their 
opponents, on the other hand, point to the dangers that result from anti- trafficking 
itself.  
 
The existence of competing claims about the 'problem' form an essential part of what 
it means to say that trafficking is a 'social problem'. The same applies to any 
proposed 'solution', since this too obviously depends on the definition of 'the 
problem'. What priority should be given to education, prevention, protection or 
prosecution? Is the proposal to create a new form of temporary work permit so as to 
facilitate circular migration opportunities part of the solution or part of the problem? 
Explaining alleged lack of 'success' must therefore go beyond the discussion of why 
the protocol is not yet fully implemented. Talking about success begs the question 
about what is meant by this. Success for whom? Who does or should decide? What 
one group will see as a loophole that enforcers need to close, others will see as a 
necessary limit beyond which it would be improper to proceed (Nelken, 1981). 
Improving the outcome of the Palermo protocol should not be treated as merely a 
technical question of social engineering because this means that we lose sight of the 
issue of who stands to benefit or loose from any given  intervention.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
migrants themselves should not be subject to criminal prosecution on grounds of their 
irregular entry' (Albano, 2009). 
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Given that international agreements typically have to paper over differences between 
those promoting action (Merry, 2006) debates over the ' real meaning' of such 
agreements are likely to be frequent and ongoing. A large number of groups (with 
sometimes surprising alliances) have been involved in debating the problem of  
trafficking - and all of these need to be considered in trying to explain the difficulty 
of finding and implementing solutions. These include the different State signatories, 
politicians, civil servants, courts and law enforcers, social workers, women's rights 
groups, on one side or other of the debate over paid sex work, religious pressure 
groups, and religious or other charities, the media, and different sectors of the sex 
industry. Because the agencies involved in dealing with the problem of trafficking 
each have their own remits we need to ask who is constructing this problem, when, 
why and how? We also need to distinguish the different local, national and 
supernational levels where the construction of globalised problems takes place, as 
well as the different factors relevant in each local context. Many of those concerned 
with migration and labour rights, for example, complain that the approach usually 
taken to applying the protocol puts disproportionate focus on source countries and the 
supply of potential migrants, rather than admitting the strong demand for low skilled 
manpower in destination countries and the need to raise the standards of work 
conditions for these workers. Those concerned with women's rights can have 
different agendas. In the process of framing the protocol, as has been well 
documented, the CATW and GAATW women's groups had sharp differences 
(Warren, 2007). The first argued that all prostitution is violence (the so called ' 
structural' viewpoint), the rival group insisted on rights of sex workers needing to be 
kept separate from coerced sex (the so -called 'agency' view). 
 
 
Attempts to apply the protocol also come up against competing national interests, for 
example amongst - and betwixt- demand, transit and supply States. If poor 'supply' 
countries have an  (inconfessable) interest in the remittances sent home by even 
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illegal migrants, 'demand' countries may not be willing to accept that they have an 
interest in having women available for commercial sex or domestic service, foreign 
children readily available for adoption, or irregular immigrants to use as cheap 
labour. The pressure of such interests are particularly important in extreme situations, 
as when supply States undergoing a demographic surge of young people, or the 
dangers, misery and unemployment of a conflict or immediately post-conflict 
situation. But, even in more economically stable countries, it is often the clash of 
interests that helps provides the key to enforcement outcomes. The struggle against 
trafficking of seasonal workers in Turkey was interrupted when the government 
realised that this could compromise the functioning of its tourism industry. In 
Lebanon it was the Catholic Church which insisted that clubs change the dancers 
every six months for fear that parishioners might otherwise form liaisons with them
12
. 
On the other hand, the interests involved are not always easy to perceive, even for 
those involved. Irregular immigrants may help keep wages down-but also stimulate a 
political backlash. It is easy for outsiders to say that those who are trafficked are 
being exploited. But some victims may hold to the hope of one day themselves 
becoming employers, having their own shop, or a group of prostitutes to control.  
 
 
What I have described as the differences between two narratives concerning the 
problem of trafficking will not easily be bridged. But there may be some possibility 
of finding common ground. Strengthening human rights may sometimes be a poor 
substitute for economic and political change. In an unjust world, however, harsh 
choices may sometime have to be made which require leaving on one side the larger 
issue of existing inequalities in order to tackle extreme cases of exploitation. At the 
same time it is important to recognise  that law and policy responses that are geared 
to dealing with extreme cases of trafficking may not be well suited to hndling the 
                                                 
12
 Personal communication from professor Cindy Smith, an American researcher into 
trafficking. 
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more common and ambiguous types of cases. We should resist the temptation to 
achieve our aims by creating the illusion of clearer moral boundaries than actually 
exist. 
 
3.   Legal culture and the implementation of the Palermo protocol 
 
It is important to emphasise the economic, political and ideological interests that have 
shaped, and continue to shape, the problem of human trafficking
13
. But we must also 
seek to show how far such pressures actually influence what goes on in the 
bureacratic, administrative and legal spheres where the Palermo protocol is (or is not) 
applied. Paying more attention to differences in legal culture (Nelken, 1997)
14
 may 
help us achieve this. 
 
Fron one point of view such differences represent an obstacle to be overcome through 
harmonization and cooperation. One of the aims of the protocol was to bring about 
greater convergence of legal definitions on trafficking so as to harmonise its 
implementation in different jurisdictions
15
. Professionals with experience in advising 
in this field explain how to overcome the practical difficulties in realizing an 
                                                 
13
 See, for example, the attempt to capture different outcomes in Holland and Sweden 
by treating them as illustrations of two opposing feminist stances towards trafficking  
(see Halley et. al. 2007.) 
14
 For a discussion of why this term is to be preferred to others such as legal system, 
legal tradition, legal mentalities or legal ideology see Nelken, 2006a.  
15
 Agreeing to standards such as those embodied in the protocol is itself intended to 
bring about more similarities, necessary to stop offenders ' taking advantage of 
differences between jurisdictions. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
implementation actually needs to be different if contexts and challenges are different. 
And there may be value in seeking to safeguard political legal and cultural diversity- 
this is indeed often the purported aim of other international legal conventions. 
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effective, internationally coordinated response (Gallagher and Holmes, 2008). No 
country, they say, can yet lay claim to genuine, extensive experience in dealing with 
trafficking as a criminal phenomenon. Most States are developing and adapting their 
criminal justice responses on the run, often under strong political pressure, and 
principally through trial and error. While communication between national criminal 
justice agencies on this issue is improving, they say, there is still very little 
cooperation or cross-fertilization of ideas across national borders. They go on to offer 
general advice on best practice - which is purportedly valid cross -culturally- about 
how to have an effective criminal justice response.  
 
Arguably, however we first must understand the specificities of legal cultures before 
we can overcome them- especially as these differences also affect the way 
supposedly cross- cultural recommendations are actually interpreted and followed. 
Researchers regularly (re) discover that countries make use of international 
agreements according to national understandings, in local ways and, often, for 
predominately local rather than collaborative purposes. Munro for example, tells us, 
that police in New South Wales searching for trafficking victims take the opportunity 
to increase their surveillance of legally recognized sex workers while, in Germany, 
local administrators continue to work with 'folk knowledge' and resist 'professional ' 
definitions of the trafficking problem (Munro, 2005, 2006).  
  
Trying to grasp ' local knowledge'  is not just something that may pique the curiosity 
of the scholarly observer. It also forms part of the everyday task of agencies, police, 
prosecutors, social workers or others who have to predict what others will do and 
explain their own practices to them as they seek to cooperate with other jurisdictions 
(Ross, 2004, 2007). Anyone working as part of a State administration or non-State 
organisation who has sought to collaborate with another jurisdiction knows that what 
actually happens can vary from locality to locality, and even from time to time. One 
issue will not necessarily be handled the same way as another apparently similar one, 
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the same matter will be treated differently in one or other legal role and by one 
person compared to another. 'Informal organization' rarely corresponds exactly to that 
prescribed by official rules and roles. In our case this is all the more important 
because the Palermo protocol allowed for considerable discretion in defining key 
terms like 'consent' or 'exploitation'. 
 
The use made of such discretion is well evidenced by empirical research on law in 
action in different jurisdictions. At the outset, for example, Australia was the most 
restrictive of signatories as far as allowing irregular immigrants to stay on in the 
country (they attached an explicit get out clause to the protocol by which it insisted 
that it should lead to any increase in immigration). Italy in time, has become one of 
the less restrictive. The Netherlands lies in between; victims of trafficking there are 
allowed temporary residence bt expected to cooperate with law enforcement (Munro, 
2005, 2006). On the other hand, whatever the formal rules say, what the police 
actually do in their law enforcement role may be surprisingly similar across 
jurisdictions. Munro tells us that it is not only in the UK that the police require proof 
of (rather than the presumption of ) non- consent, Even in Italy, where the anti-
trafficking rules also stipulate an exclusive emphasis on exploitation, there remains 
amongst officials an underlying reluctance to abandon reliance on consent altogether. 
Thus, one senior police officer in Rome she interviewed talked persistently about the 
need to discover the ‘very trafficked victims’, as opposed to those who, despite 
having been exploited, were acting with some degree of agency. He explained that 
you have to prove that you are trafficked—people coming in involuntarily and doing 
prostitution involuntarily, unwillingly, you are forced, you are under threat. (Munro, 
2006)  
 
Law in action is a complex combination of local differences in governing principles, 
rules and procedures of the 'law in books' as well as the patterns that actually exist in 
the way such differences are instantiated in, used as justifications and alibis, or 'got 
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round', in the 'working rules' of everyday practice. But it is also an aspect of legal 
culture more generally. (Nelken, 2004) We need to examine the relationship between 
different approaches to immigration (see e.g. Favell 1998), styles of migration 
controls and ways of implementing anti -trafficking? Why is it that demand countries 
that are most open to licensing and taxing prostitution such as Netherlands and 
Germany seem to be those least keen on helping trafficked victims to stay on in the 
country? In what way is the 'success' that has been achieved by Sweden's attack on 
the demand for prostitution related to its approach to the Palermo protocol? How are 
we to explain Italy's relative success in protecting trafficking victims? How far can 
and will the Italian model be copied in other places?  
 
For those interested in using legal culture as an explanation it can be helpful to 
distinguish between 'internal' and 'external' legal culture- especially where the 
question concerns the relationship between law and social change (Friedman, 1997) . 
'Internal legal culture' refers to the ideas and behaviour of those within the law such 
as policemen, lawyers, or judges. 'External legal culture', on the other hand, points to 
the pressures bought to bear on law from wider society, and includes what ordinary 
people expect of the law and whether or not they trust legal institutions. Differences 
in external legal culture, for example in the willingness to trust the police,  clearly 
play an important role  in explaining whether those trafficked call on help from legal 
institutions even in the country of arrival.  
 
The term legal culture can point to a number of other contrasts that need to be 
considered if we are to understand differences in the enforcement of the protocol. It 
can be useful to know that in some places it is the police themselves who make policy 
and act as spokesman regarding the handing of transnational crime problems whereas 
elsewhere this is left rather to prosecutors, judges- or politicians. When it comes to 
interpreting the meaning of legal culture it can be important to note that 'enforcement' 
is not an easily translatable local term in all languages. The same cultural variability 
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applies to almost all the words mobilised explicitly or implicitly when writing about 
human trafficking, such as rights, security, victims, exploitation, consent, organised 
crime - or any other word in the Esperanto of international law and human rights 
organisations 
 
In general, where State law is not well entrenched it may be common to sign on to 
international agreements whilst not doing much to implement them. But legal culture 
also characterises the details of enforcement and non -enforcement. Take for example 
Moldova - one of the poorest countries in Europe and highly dependent on US aid. 
Here difficulties in dealing with organised criminals are, in part, the result of absence 
of specific legislation  to deal with these kinds of criminals and an approach to 
criminal procedure that include resistance to the use of informants and a reluctance to 
allow plea bargaining, seen as unethical behaviour. At the same time, however, it 
seems that policemen are often in league with traffickers, cases that are brought 
against offenders go on for years, judges are said to be often unsympathetic to such 
cases and traffickers, at worst, are given short prison sentences. Even important 
officials dealing with trafficking, given prizes for their work, may turn out to be in 
collusion with traffickers, and there is little internal pressure to bring such officials to 
book (Finnegan, 2008). 
 
This said, the term legal culture does not offer any 'quick fix' by pointing us to the 
crucial intervening variable that will inevitably explain shortfalls of enforcement. 
Sometimes culture is no more than a name for what itself needs to be explained by 
other features of the social context in which such patterns of legally related attitudes 
behaviour are found (Nelken, 2004, 2005, 2007). If we are trying to use the term to 
explain what happens in a given country, agency or institution, we have to be careful 
not to say that they must act as they do because of their legal culture - and still more 
not to assume that they must continue to act in that way for the foreseeable future. As 
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with the term culture itself this can otherwise lead to a tautology of the sort that goes 
'why do the Japanese (police) do what they do? Because they are Japanese!  
 
As anthropologists have increasingly insisted, culture is not determining, unitary or 
unchanging, nor do cultures have hermetic boundaries. Cultures are rarely as 
coherent as they claim to be. To some extent at least, social actors have a choice in 
how they draw on their culture(s) so we need to be cautious when we - or they- 
invoke culture - or legal culture -to explain or justify the action taken. Culture 
changes over time and sometimes change is actively sought.The making of laws, as 
well as the activity of policy makers, presupposes that social practices are not fixed. 
So called 'legal transplants' - involving processes of borrowing, imitation or 
imposition - have always played a large part in the development of legal systems. 
With globalisation, pressures to convergence and other transnational trends can more 
easily blur the differences between places. The question must always be why, and by 
whom, given patterns of attitudes and behaviour are produced - and reproduced.  
It is argued by legal theorists that 'coherence' and consistency is what law claims and 
needs to achieve. In trying to predict the outcome of anti -trafficking it can therefore 
be crucial to see how the interventions it inspires interact with other legal rights and 
obligations such as those that affect tenancy rules in red light districts, the bargaining 
powers of unionised sex workers, or the attempts to reduce the spread of AIDS 
(Halley, et. al., 2007).  
 
We also need to relate legal culture to culture more generally. (The term 'external 
legal culture ' itself may be seen as one way of conceiving of a transmission belt from 
wider culture to legal culture). In the case of many proposed international norms 
there is considerable discussion of cultural differences, and the right to such 
differences- as in the idea of the alleged distinctiveness of 'Asian values'. But the 
struggle against human trafficking seems to have earned at least the formal 
endorsement of a very large number of countries with little attempt to treat this as a 
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specifically Western type of human right. Writers describing the situation in Africa 
are amongst those most outspoken on the human costs of trafficking (Falola and 
Afolabi, 2007). Leading experts on human trafficking who are also Muslims go to 
great lengths to show that the types of conduct involved in (almost
16
) all of the types 
of trafficking that international conventions currently seek to prevent are also strictly 
condemned by Islam (Mattar, 2004).  
 
At the same time it is not difficult to point to a variety of more or less entrenched 
social or cultural practices -whether in supply, in transit or in demand countries -that 
provide some of the conditions in which such behaviour becomes possible. In some 
of the supply countries in Asia and Africa there are more or less institutionalised 
practices that can shade into trafficking. These include bonded labour in agriculture 
and elsewhere, enforced domestic labour, organised prostitution both for foreign 
tourists as for locals, gender violence and discrimination, employment of children, 
bride kidnapping,  the marrying off of young brides, the sending away of young 
people ostensibly for education or work training purposes who are then obliged to 
earn their keep by begging or worse. In some places prayers are offered up for the 
success of emigrants including some who might be considered trafficked according to 
the Protocol. Such remittances as they manage to send back represent an important 
part of the local economy. In demand countries, by contrast, the practices that may be 
more relevant include the commodification of sex and labour, the willingness to 
import anything, from 'orphans' for adoption to body parts, and the assumption that 
anything can be had at a price - plus local cultural justifications for the creation of as 
class of ' non- persons'. 
 
                                                 
16
 Mattar (2004) admits that there are important differences between Sunnis and 
Shiites over temporary marriage and child marriage before puberty. Some other 
widespread practices he considers to be a result of tribal law or a misinterpretation of 
Koranic principles. 
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General cultural differences also have their effects on enforcement. For example, 
more ' pragmatic' cultures, such as Anglo -American common law countries, will 
often have an approach to law and legal procedure that is more policy oriented or 
'instrumental' than is found in less pragmatic countries.
17
 But other types of societies, 
as well as inter-governmental organisations and NGOs', may all at various times 
choose to treat law in this way. And this approach to legal culture may be becoming 
more generally influential, as part of the spreading of Anglo -American (legal) 
culture. At all events, all this helps us appreciate that alleged shortfalls in 
enforcement are not accidental but are linked to the way the continuation of such 
practices are made possible within local articulations of law, religion and politics. 
 
On the other hand, we should not assume that understanding the wider social context 
will always tell us the character of a given legal culture. Especially, but not only, in 
less industrially developed societies we need to be aware of the many situations of 
legal pluralism in which State law competes with rival normative orders, which often 
encapsulate a different approach to social order based on other loyalties and 
principles. But, even in relatively homogenous States, the task allocated to State law 
may be that of being distinctive or in contrast to ordinary culture, for example 
privileging written rather oral  relationships, operating on different time schemes, or 
generally standing for ideas and ideals that are not (yet) strongly entrenched in 
everyday practice in wider society. In such societies- or parts of them- actors often 
speak of battles for the 'culture of legality'. The degree to which law is supposed to - 
or succeeds in being - relatively autonomous from economics and politics - is itself 
one of the legal cultural variables that needs to be better understood. In the common 
law world there may be more open and accepted links between law and the needs of 
the economy, but in the continental European world the more obvious coupling 
(though one often marked by boundary struggles) is between law and politics. In 
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 Though pragmatic cultures may fail to appreciate that pragmatism itself may have 
its limits, and pragmatism cannot tell them when not to be pragmatic (Nelken, 2009)  
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other settings religious culture may be the most relevant factor to investigate and law 
no more than one manifestation of it.  
 
Other problems with using the term legal culture also need to be born in mind 
(Nelken, 2007a). One of the most important of these has to do with how to decide the 
'unit' or level of culture on which to focus. Larger cultural differences (in economic,  
religious, family, or sexual  matters) inevitably shape what is considered harmful and 
what can and should be done about it. But such differences are not limited to- and do 
not always coincide with- the boundaries between national jurisdictions.The range of 
references for the term legal culture goes well beyond the single nation- State, as seen 
in the use of phrases like ' modern legal culture' ,'Western legal culture', Islamic legal 
culture(s) or 'local court cultures'. But it also relates to what goes on at a lower level. 
At the sub -State level of trafficking for example we need to consider action by 
regions and municipalities as in the role of zoning and other interventions (Carchedi, 
Stridbeck, and Tola, 2009). According to critics of the term, this promiscuity of 
references is what makes the term implausible and subject to circular argument 
(Cotterrell, 1997). But it could be argued- using the Palermo protocol as an example- 
that mapping such multiplicity at the transnational, national and local levels is exactly 
what is needed.  
 
As these various units respond to the problem of trafficking they are themselves 
changed in the process. In seeking to understand the legal cultures at work in 
responding to trafficking it is not enough just to focus on a nation state- taken singly. 
When Italian ships intercept (or do not intercept) boats bringing in illegal migrants or 
when Italy makes reciprocal agreements with Libya or the countries of the Maghreb 
this has implications for other European countries. Conversely, what Italy can and 
cannot do depends on the actions of other countries or groupings of countries. There 
are for example, important overall contrasts between the way the US and the EU go 
about dealing with transnational crimes such as the trade in illegal drugs. In dealing 
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with drug supplying countries in Latin America the USA is much more likely to see 
the problem as an ' external' threat to its morals, to be dealt with by a military or 
military- style approach- even though this can create political instability. The 
European Community, on the other hand, takes a development -oriented approach 
geared at creating alternatives to the local need to rely on drug profits - but this 
approach can easily founder in situations of political and military instability (Fukumi, 
2009). These differences may have parallels here. If we are to promote better 
collaboration between US and European countries in dealing with human trafficking 
it is essential to be aware of such contrasting approaches. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper tries to answer the question of whether differences in legal culture may 
help explain the way the Palermo protocol on trafficking is being applied. In the first 
part of my discussion I accepted, for argument's sake, that what needed to be 
understood was the under-enforcement and limited application of the protocol and I 
considered what criminological explanations there could be for this. I then went on to 
question this starting point so as to examine trafficking as a social problem. In this 
perspective claims about the success or failure of anti -trafficking are to be 
understood as themselves part of the struggle for particular (and particularistic) 
readings of the protocol. In the last section I examined difficulties in using the 
concept of legal culture in seeking to understand different responses to the protocol 
and the difficulties this can cause for international collaboration. 
 
Recognising that there are differences between legal cultures shows us why if we 
wish to ensure respect for international legal instruments we need to go beyond the 
stage of signing and perhaps ratifying them. On the other hand, whilst learning about 
legal culture can provide us with valuable insights we also need to be careful not to  
reify culture as a way of making outcomes seem predestined, nor should we assume 
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given choices only have their desired effects. What is felt to be a 'scandal' varies 
between places, but it also varies over time. The definitions of trafficking proposed 
by those working in pressure groups, international organisations or in roles of liaison 
between national administrations will often be different to those used on the ground 
by locally based politicians, policeman, social workers, or charities. But they can, 
under some circumstances, eventually serve to transform them.
18 
 
 
Showing that differences in legal culture play out as part of a larger struggle over 
interests and values is not an argument for inactivity in the face of injustice, but it 
does suggest that it is not enough to apply general prescriptions based on the goal of 
extending human rights for the outcomes to be automatically positive. As David 
Kennedy, a leading Harvard based 'progressive' international lawyer, reminds us, we 
must be alert to the possibility that even the pursuit of human rights can have 
negative effects (Kennedy, 2001). In some places, human rights implementation can 
make a repressive State more efficient, and co-opt sectors of civil society that might 
otherwise be opposed. Arguments from human rights have been used to strengthen, 
defend, legitimate a variety of repressive initiatives- to legitimate war, defend the 
death penalty, the entitlements of majorities, religious repression, access to (or 
restriction of) abortion, and so forth.  
 
Of particular relevance for our purposes, Kennedy insists that, as currently deployed, 
the human rights movement may do a great deal to take questions of the distribution 
of life chances off the national and international development agendas. He claims that 
this movement often remains tone-deaf to the specific political consequences of its 
activity in particular locations, on the mistaken assumption that a bit more human 
rights can never make things worse. He admits, of course, that all interventions (not 
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 It can be interesting to compare the success of other efforts to make criminal justice 
concepts 'travel well'. For an illuminating discussion of the different fortunes of 
prison rights and corruption see Twining (Twining, 2005). 
 34 
just those inspired by the pursuit of human rights) have possible downsides and carry 
risks. We cannot always know in advance what will be their overall outcomes. But he 
urges caution. 
 
Some feminist scholars and activists who use the anti -trafficking movement as an 
illustration of what they call Governance Feminism (GF) think that Kennedy's points 
do apply here. 'Our sense at the moment ' they argue, ' is that a preoccupation with 
normative achievements (message sending, making rape/sexual violence visible, 
changing hearts and minds among elites and across populations) and a legal 
imaginaire in which prohibition would “stop” or “end” conduct harmful to women—
or decriminalize it in order to liberate them and give scope to their agency—animates 
the GF projects we are studying and detaches them from a certain pragmatic attitude 
and interest in complex distributional consequences that we seek to bring to the 
domain. '  
 
Their case studies, in places as different as India and Israel, suggest that - 'the result, 
so far at least, is not to  “end prostitution” in Israel and India, but to rearrange the 
micro-investments of power locally'. The authors argue that they are 'working, 
methodologically, for a new legal realism that would anticipate the complex ways in 
which legal entities meet complex societies' and complain that ' (t)he highly 
contingent and complex relationship between law in the books and law in action—
and the multitudinous ways in which the legal system can be designed to shape but 
cannot control this relationship— seem to fall outside the scope of feminist concern. 
Feminist advocacy that imagines prohibition to involve “stopping” or “ending” 
sexual violence and/or commercial exploitation of sex workers brackets all the social 
contingency our legal realist and critical analysis would bring into focus. For 
example, the possible bad and unintended consequences of the resulting rules seem to 
fall outside the scope of feminist concern ' (Halley, et. al., 2007). All this reinforces 
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the need to consider carefully the likely effects of efforts to improve the application 
of the protocol.  
 
The main claim of this paper is that, before referring to legal culture in accounting for 
how different places behave when applying the protocol, we first need to know more 
about the nature of the 'problem' being faced and the way the way the 'problem' is 
constructed. I will finish by saying something more about the Italian situation by way 
of illustration. Insofar as policy makers want to seek to learn from and encourage 
'best practice' the Italian case may also be considered of particular interest. Many of 
the Italian representatives  at the 2009 Palermo workshop- especially prosecutors 
with considerable experience in dealing with cases of organised crime, as well as 
judges working with international organisations, argued that Italy was in fact one of 
those countries that was most advanced in interpreting and applying the protocol. By 
contrast, they claimed that places with the reputation of being progressive in matters 
such as women's rights, such as Sweden or Netherlands, had a much poorer record in 
this matter.  
 
But, as ever, the criteria for deciding what counts as success are contested ones. In a 
2006 report, referred to in the Wikipedia entry on 'Human trafficking', the Future 
Group, a Canadian humanitarian organization dedicated to combating human 
trafficking and the child sex trade, ranked eight industrialized nations in terms of 
their performance. Canada received an F rating, the United Kingdom received a D, 
while the United States received a B+ and Australia, Norway, Sweden, Germany and 
Italy all received grades of B or B- (Future Group, 2006). The USA might get a 
different assessment if we were take into account the massive Mexican - or Chinese 
illegal immigration to the United States- and the thousands of Mexicans killed at the 
border. 
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Be this as it may, Italian legislation and judicial decisions do seem to be generous in 
their definition of trafficking, and provide protection to victims even when they are 
unwilling to provide evidence against their traffickers. The current legal provisions 
allow them to apply for permanent residence after 21 months if they have found 
employment. Compared to many other European countries a relatively high number 
of women ask for and receive protection. It seems reasonable to ask therefore what 
are the conditions that make possible Italy's (relative) success here, and what place 
legal culture plays in this? Could other places learn from Italy or even take it as a 
model to be imitated? These questions are all the more interesting given that what 
else we know about Italian legal culture would have predicted a quite different 
outcome. After all, other information tells us that Italy is one of the countries that 
takes the longest in Europe before coming into line with European Union or 
international directives. Coming more specifically to the kind of legal protection 
envisaged by the Protocol, Italy's criminal justice system is not very victim - oriented, 
and its victim- support movement is not anything like as well developed as in many 
other advanced western countries
19
.   
 
One solution to this apparent puzzle could be to say that, whatever the protections 
offered by the 'law in the books' it is simply not true that Italy is in practice more 
active in applying the protocol than other countries. Because of the lack of 
comparable cross- national data on the number of cases dealt with in relation to the 
                                                 
19
 In Italy, partly as a result of the influence of Catholic culture, victims are often 
expected 'to forgive' rather than ask for revenge. Relatedly, as a 'state society', 
punishing is considered something to be carried out for the ' general interest' by 'the 
state' (Nelken, 2005). In many Protestant countries, with a 'liberal' idea of the state, 
by contrast, victims are put on a pedestal as representatives of the 'community' for 
whose defence - as potential or actual victims- the state/ government justifies its 
existence. 
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number of potential cases of trafficking, we cannot be sure how Italy's figures 
compare with those elsewhere. There are a number of reasons why the number of 
people trafficked to Italy -itself a function of the number of illegal migrants- could be 
much larger than in many comparable countries. First of all there is the power 
exercised by four major entrenched organised crime groups. Then there is its 
geographical position, with an exposed coastline and proximity to Africa, and the 
large poorly regulated black economy and demand for illegal workers - in the 
agricultural, industrial sectors and sex trades. Enforcement of laws against the 
exploitation of prostitutes, for example, is characterised by a high level of de facto 
'tolerance' which makes it difficult to know how many of these are trafficked.  
 
If these factors mean that Italy has a relatively high number of cases of trafficked 
victims then it would be no surprise (and not a mark of merit) if Italy has more 
opportunity to apply the protocol. The relatively large number of protection orders 
could even be taken as evidence of difficulties of preventing such cases arriving there 
in the first place. If what we are measuring is activity more broadly geared to 
prevention and protection of immigrants or of those in the sex trade, then the small 
number of cases of trafficking victims protected in Sweden and the Netherlands is 
open to another interpretation. Sweden deals with few cases because it relies instead 
on prosecuting prostitutes' clients (an approach which England and Wales is now 
trying to copy by making it illegal to buy sex if the prostitute turns out to be held 
against her will). The Netherlands, by contrast, seeks to legalise and regulating the 
trade in sex so as to curb the demand for trafficked victims. By contrast, there is 
every reason to doubt that the Italian response to trafficked victims has done much if 
anything to help introduce more ' rational' ways of regulating immigration or sex 
work generally. 
 
It would be wrong, however, just to 'explain away' claims that Italy is especially 
effective in dealing with trafficking cases. After all, the fact that the protocol was 
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signed in Palermo (as well as the presence of a number of relevant intergovernmental 
and NGO groups on its territory) may have given Italy some sense of 'ownership' of 
this struggle. Because there is more organised crime in Italy than in many other 
European countries this has also given the criminal justice system more experience in 
dealing with it. Concern for victims may have increasingly become the justification 
for the application of the  criminal law in countries whose legal cultures are more 
influenced by liberal  individualism, Protestantism and the common law. But the 
effects of this may be less straightforward when it comes to foreign victims of 
trafficking who are considered to some extent authors of their own plight. Italy, by 
contrast, may be a country with a relatively higher tolerance for ambiguity. Those  
handling organised crime cases have evolved a (sometimes controversial) approach to 
of collaborators from the ranks of organised crime - the so called pentiti. Because the 
victim in Italy is not the justification for punishment there may be more willingness 
to protect flawed victims. Strong input from the Catholic Church as well as lay 
groups working with marginal people, is also relevant to the help given to these kinds 
of victims even in the absence of a strong victim movement in mainstream criminal 
justice. 
 
Other more general, debatable and debated features of Italian legal culture could also 
be relevant here. The degree of independence from government enjoyed by judges 
and prosecutors in Italy can cause problems in coordinating crime policy- and, 
according to their opponents, contributes to political instability. But because judges 
often find that they have to substitute for politicians in dealing with endemic social 
problems  such as corruption (their so-called role of 'supplenza') this gives them more 
of a free hand than in some other jurisdictions. Thus judges and prosecutors can 
extend protection to these particular victims even if this may not be very popular with 
governments or public opinion- who are usually keener on cracking down on 
anything connected to illegal immigration. Because the Italian approach to law and 
procedure is relatively more rights- based than pragmatic this may also explain why 
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laws based on human rights are taken more seriously than more pragmatic countries 
(though we should not forget that Italian judges can also be very 'pragmatic' in the 
way that they actually use law to pursue their ideas and ideals). If Italian legal 
procedures are afflicted by delays this may make it all the easier to allow for decent 
'cooling off periods' so that victims of trafficking can overcome their trauma and 
decide what they want to do next. What is a disadvantage in one setting can be a plus 
in another. The main reason to seek to learn more about culture - and legal culture- 
and not merely focus on economics and politics is because of the way in can help us 
make sense of such apparent paradoxes. 
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